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In 2016, the Angolan banking sector mandatorily adopted the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS). Its effects on the cost of equity, exceedingly high in Angolan banks 
and a key variable to attract investors, are controversial, with some literature suggesting it decreases 
after the adoption. This paper examines the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on the cost of 
equity, in Angolan banks in the period 2012-2016. The results show that the adoption of IFRS is 
not relevant in explaining the cost of equity, on the short-term, contrary to other company-specific 
variables, such as size, leverage, ROA, auditors’ opinion and ownership concentration. 
Keywords: Angola, Banking sector, Cost of equity, IAS/IFRS, mandatory adoption 
1. Introduction 
Until 2014, Angola was one of the fastest-growing economies in Sub-Saharan Africa, with an 
annual average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of 10.3%. With oil representing around 
75% of government revenue and 95% of all exports, the Angolan economy is highly dependent on 
a single and volatile industry1. Recognizing that depending solely on oil is no longer a viable 
development option, the Angolan government is trying to strengthen other industries by attracting 
foreign investment. 
An attractive business environment is necessary, which is a challenge to Angola2. With 
corruption present in all levels of business and government3, there is low confidence in the markets, 
a high cost of capital and a severe lack of transparency. One way through which the government is 
                                                          
1 As a consequence of the sharp decline in oil prices, the whole economy suffered and the GDP fell 20%, in 2015 
(Euromonitor International 2018). 
2 According to the Ease of Doing Business Rankings of 2017, Angola ranked 175 out of 190 countries (The World 
Bank 2018), being one of the most difficult countries to do business, in areas such as getting credit, trading across 
borders, enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency. 
3 According to the Corruption Perception Index of 2017 (Transparency International 2018), Angola ranks 167 out of 
180 countries, being perceived as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. 
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trying to attract investors is by opening a stock market4 and adopting global accounting standards, 
the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), in its banking sector, in 2016.  
In current markets, most businesses and investors diversify their portfolios and expand 
operations through cross-border investments. Hence, the demand for a set of universal standards, 
to which all the participants in the market abide, has grown exponentially (Banco Nacional de 
Angola 2014). The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASB) started in the early 
2000s issuing a set of high-quality International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). By 2005, 
most European countries and others around the world already required its use by financial 
institutions. The IFRS Foundation’s goal is to provide “a high quality, internationally recognized 
set of accounting standards that bring transparency, accountability and efficiency to financial 
markets around the world” (IFRS Foundation 2018). Transparency, by increasing comparability 
and quality of financial information; accountability, by providing investors with information on 
how managers are handling their capital; and efficiency by reducing the cost of capital and 
reporting costs. The mandatory adoption of IFRS in the Angolan banking sector arose from the 
efforts the country is making towards positioning the banking sector as the “economy’s engine”, 
as the governor of the Angolan National Bank, Banco Nacional de Angola (BNA), emphasized in 
2017 (ANGOP 2017).  
The economic effects of mandatory adoption of IFRS are a controversial subject, however. 
There is still no consensus on its effects, among the accounting community. While some believe it 
increases the transparency, quality and relevance of reported information, thereby enhancing 
international investment and reducing the cost of capital (Ionasçu, et al. 2014), others defend that 
the benefits of adopting new standards may not outweigh the costs (Thompson 2016). The impact 
                                                          
4 It has not opened yet but there is already a secondary market for public debt. 
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of adopting IFRS on the cost of equity, for example, is one of the most divisive subjects. A critical 
variable for investors, this particular issue is of paramount importance in developing countries, in 
which the cost of equity and the demand for foreign investment is higher and the capital markets 
are less developed. Especially in Africa, the subject is even more undeveloped, as research on the 
area is very scarce. Therefore, this paper fills this void by analyzing the impact of the IFRS adoption 
on the cost of equity, in Angolan banks. It will help standard setters and decision makers in the 
process of choosing whether to adopt IFRS.  
This Work Project analyzes the evolution of the cost of equity in Angolan banks in order to 
identify the country and the company-specific factors that may influence it, with a special focus on 
the effects of the mandatory adoption of IFRS. The results of an ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression model showed that the variables with greater influence on the cost of equity were the 
banks’ size, leverage, profitability, auditors’ opinion and ownership concentration. In contrast, the 
adoption of IFRS, dividends, effective tax rate, auditor, managers’ independence and the 
macroeconomic variables (GDP, inflation rate, free-interest rate and corruption index) did not 
influence the cost of equity. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the theoretical framework regarding 
the cost of equity and the contextual background concerning the banking sector and financial 
reporting in Angola. Section 3 reviews the literature on the effects of the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS, with special emphasis on the cost of equity. Section 4 outlines the research questions, the 
research model tested in this research, the sample, and data. Section 5 presents and discusses the 
results. Section 6 concludes with a summary of the main findings, contribution, limitations and 
suggestions for future research. 
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2. Theoretical Framework and Contextual Background 
Cost of equity: concept, estimation and determinants 
The cost of equity is the rate of return required by investors, for the capital they invest in a 
company (Brealey, Myers and Allen 2010)5. Several models can estimate the cost of equity, each 
with its advantages and limitations. Among the models to estimate the cost of equity, are the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the Price Earnings Growth model (rPEG) and the Gordon’s 
Dividend Growth model.  
The CAPM calculates the cost of equity by adding the risk-free rate of return to the market 
risk premium, adjusted to the company’s sensitivity to the market, symbolized by beta6. However, 
this model is not able to explain expected returns in detail or to capture both the firm and market-
specific risk, as it does not eliminate information asymmetry (Fama and French 1992). Moreover, 
for the estimation of the beta, which is a risk measure of exposure to the market, a regression 
between the banks’ returns and the market is required, which is not available for Angolan banks.  
Most researchers refer to the Price Earnings Growth model, rPEG, as the best proxy for the 
cost of equity (Lee, Walker and Christensen 2008, Patro 2014, Castillo, Menéndez and Orgaz 
2014). This model, developed by Easton in 2004, estimates the expected return, as perceived by 
the market, taking into consideration its perception of a firm’s risk, as well as the rate of change in 
abnormal earnings growth (Easton 2004)7. The simplified formula for the model is presented in 
Appendix A. The use of this model requires earnings’ estimation, limiting its use when those 
estimates do not exist. To the best of our knowledge, there is no previous application of the rPEG 
                                                          
5 This minimum threshold can be the cost of equity, cost of debt or weighted average cost of capital (WACC), whether 
a company chooses to finance its operations through equity, debt or both, respectively. 
6 Beta is calculated by dividing the covariance of the returns of a certain bank with the returns of the market by the 
variance of the market returns. 
7 The rPEG is an adaptation of the PEG model, by relaxing some of its assumptions and acknowledging the importance 
of earnings’ short-term forecasts in the estimation of the cost of equity.  
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model to Angolan companies, probably due to the lack of analysts’ short-term forecasts on their 
earnings.  
One approach to the estimation of the cost of equity that does not require any analyst estimation 
of future earnings is the Gordon’s Dividend Growth model, shown in Appendix B. In this model, 
the value of a company is calculated by discounting the dividends expected for the following year 
in perpetuity, using the cost of capital (Damodaran 2003). By rearranging the formula, the cost of 
equity can be isolated but it can be only computed in firms that pay dividends.  
In order to prevent skewing the sample by merely choosing banks that pay dividends, we will 
use an adjusted version of this model, based on earnings instead of dividends. Every year’s net 
income can either be distributed to shareholders or retained by the company for reinvestment. The 
original formula considers that the return for investors is restricted to dividends. However, very 
often banks do not pay dividends but increase their equity by retaining earnings, which by itself 
raises the value of the company. In our proposed adjusted version of the model, we consider that 







In which, Re is the cost of equity; EPS0 are the earnings per share, in moment 0; BV is the book 
value per share of each bank; g is the earnings growth rate. We calculate the expected growth rate 
by averaging the historical growth rates and assuming it remains constant in perpetuity. The book 
value is used, instead of the market value, because there is no stock market in Angola. 
The cost of capital is also perceived by investors as a signal of a company’s risk, and it can be 
derived from country-specific factors, such as political and economic conditions, or from company-




Contextual Background: The Angolan banking sector and its financial reporting 
The fall in oil prices and fragility of the national currency caused the inflation rate to spike to 
excessive levels8. In response, BNA increased the reference interest rates and mandatory reserves 
in national currency, from 25 to 30 percent. Though the Angolan economy is going through a phase 
of stagnation, the banking sector continues growing and developing. In 2016, the electronic means 
of payment, the number of Automated Teller Machines (ATMs), payment terminals, transactions, 
employees, counters, clients’ deposits, net income and assets increased, following the trend of the 
previous five years (KPMG 2016). Recent developments that are influencing the industry are the 
overall increase in the population’s literacy and education, bringing new challenges to the market, 
and the adoption of IAS/IFRS (Deloitte 2017).  
In 2014, Banco Nacional de Angola (BNA), the governmental entity responsible for the 
Angolan banking supervision, released a plan for the full convergence of the national accounting 
systems to the IFRS. The national accounting system for banks (Plano Contabilístico das 
Instituições Financeiras, CONTIF), was replaced in order to comply with the recommendations of 
international financial institutions and to improve the comparability and transparency of 
information on a global scale (Banco Nacional de Angola 2014).  
In a first phase, as part of the gradual adoption process, from 2016 onwards Angolan banks 
that met at least one of the following five criteria were required to report under IFRS: (i) banks 
with assets above 300,000 million Kwanzas; (ii) banks listed on the stock exchange; (iii) banks 
with subsidiaries domiciled abroad; (iv) a subsidiary of a company domiciled abroad, with 
headquarters in Angola; (v) subsidiaries of an institution that met any of the previous criteria. Any 
                                                          
8 Inflation rate in Angola rose from 10.3% in 2015 to 34.7% in 2016 (The World Bank 2018).  
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bank that met at least one was obliged to report under IFRS9. Other banks could voluntarily report 
under IFRS, from January 2016 onwards (IFRS Foundation 2017). In the second phase, from 2017 
onwards, the obligation to report under IFRS extended to all banks operating in Angola. 
Acknowledging the predicaments banks would face when adopting the new standards, BNA also 
released instructions on how to overcome them. It set a plan based on three main pillars: training 
of employees, adaptation of control procedures and adequacy of information systems10.  
This research analyzes periods in which it compares information reported under two different 
accounting standards. Thus, it is important to highlight the key differences between them. As 
required by IFRS 111, Angolan banks are obliged to make transitioning adjustments to their 
financial statements and report the previous year’s reconciliation of shareholders' equity and net 
income, under the two methods. The two most relevant accounts in the adjustments were 
Impairments and the Effective Tax rate12 (Deloitte 2017). 
As it is shown in Appendix C, the total adjustments in the Angolan banks that adopted IFRS, 
amounted to a decrease in Equity of 10 billion Kwanzas and a decrease in Net Income of 5 billion 
Kwanzas, in 2015 (Deloitte 2017). However, these amounts only represent a decrease of 2.17% 
and 4.27% of the values reported under CONTIF. These accounting changes bring implications to 
the calculation of the cost of equity. As it is estimated by dividing EPS (Net Income) for the BV 
(Equity), it is slightly lower under IFRS.  
 
                                                          
9 Before 2016, no Angolan bank applied IFRS in their financial reporting and only one bank (Banco Comercial 
Angolano) reported voluntarily in 2016. 
10 Banco de Desenvolvimento de Angola and Banco de Poupança e Crédito, two state-owned banks, were required to 
report under IFRS in 2016 but did not comply. 
11 IFRS 1 - First-time Adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards. 
12 In 2015, the adjustments to impairments had a negative impact of 6.823 and 4.186 million Kwanzas in the 
Shareholder’s Equity and Net Income, respectively. The most significant effect of the effective tax rate adjustments 




3. Literature Review 
There is plenty of normative and empirical literature on the adoption of IFRS, but still no 
consensus was achieved on whether its benefits outweigh the costs. This section reviews the stream 
of literature regarding IFRS adoption and its impact on the cost of equity, as to understand the 
implications of adopting these reporting standards. 
There is controversy on whether international standards are applicable to developing countries, 
which already struggle to sustain their own regional accounting standards (Thompson 2016). In 
fact, some developing countries, which adopted the IFRS, suffered many institutional, enforcement 
and technical challenges when implementing them (United Nations 2008). Institutional problems 
happened, for example, in countries in which previous regulations that were not properly adjusted, 
directly contradicted IFRS guidelines, often regarding the presentation of information13. 
Enforcement problems emerged mostly in countries with high corruption levels, in which the rule 
of law was undermined by private interests. Technical problems were generally a result of language 
barriers, increased costs in training and lack of expertise in the field of international standards, both 
in the private sector and regulatory bodies14. Moreover, the impact of using IFRS goes beyond 
accounting, affecting all areas of business, such as tax, human resources and information 
management (Deloitte 2008). 
These complications make it even harder to collect any benefit from using global standards. 
However, studies also show the adoption of such standards brings advantages to the economy, even 
in developing countries. Regarding Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), several papers present 
evidence that countries adopting IFRS often benefit from an increase of global investors’ 
                                                          
13 In Pakistan, the surplus on revaluation of fixed assets was demonstrated after capital and reserves, which directly 
contradicts IAS 16 directive to attribute it to equity. 




confidence in the financial statements which results in an increase of FDI inflows (Okpala 2012, 
Lungu, Caraiani and Dascălu 2017). Other reported benefits are higher quality, transparency, 
comparability and reliability of financial reports, increased market efficiency, better corporate 
governance practices, with some studies, showing a decrease in the cost of capital (Nobes and 
Parker 2004, Albu and Albu 2012). 
Despite previous research confirming the voluntary adoption of IFRS decreases the cost of 
capital (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000), there is controversy regarding the effects of mandatory 
adoption of IFRS in the cost of capital. Some researchers conclude that the cost of capital decreases 
after mandatory IFRS adoption (Li 2010), whereas others find little evidence of any association 
(Barth, Landsman and Lang 2006) or suggest it is only noticeable in countries where institutions 
have incentives to be transparent and the rule of law is properly enforced (Daske, et al. 2008, Albu 
and Albu 2012). The prevailing theory is that the adoption of IFRS increases the disclosure of 
reliable and comparable information in contrast to domestic standards, more so in developing 
countries (Okpala 2012). Studies have revealed direct and indirect links between the increase in 
quality of information reported and decrease of the cost of capital (Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia 
2007).  
Provided that Angola is a developing country seeking foreign investment and to strengthen the 
banking sector15, the effects of adopting IFRS and the expected decrease in the cost of equity would 
highly benefit the Angolan economy. However, to the best of our knowledge, this topic has not 
been studied before. Thus, this Work Project, contributes to the literature by adding evidence on 
the effects of the mandatory adoption of IFRS in the cost of equity, in Angolan banks.  
                                                          
15 In April 2018, the Angolan Finance Minister Archer Mangueira, requested the help of the International Monetary 
Fund in developing a program for economic policy coordination, in its continuous efforts to attract Foreign Direct 
Investment (Negócios 2018). 
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4. Research Design  
This Work Project aims to understand which factors influence the cost of equity in Angolan 
banks, with a special focus on the impact of the mandatory adoption of IFRS. Hence, it analyses 
the evolution of the cost of equity, focusing on the banking sector, as it is currently the only sector 
mandatorily reporting under IFRS, in Angola. 
Apart from studying the impact the adoption of IFRS had on the cost of equity, this paper also 
analyzes other variables that may influence the cost of equity. These variables can be grouped into 
company-specific variables (size, leverage, profitability, dividends, effective tax rate, enforcement 
quality and corporate governance practices) and country-specific variables (GDP, inflation rate, 
risk-free interest rate and level of corruption). This Work Project addresses the three following 
Research Questions (RQ):  
RQ1: How did the cost of equity in Angolan banks evolve over time?  
To answer RQ1, the cost of equity is estimated over the periods 2012-2016 for every bank in 
the sample, using an adjusted version of the Dividend’s Growth Model, and a descriptive statistical 
analysis (univariate and bivariate), in order to characterize its evolution and identify the factors that 
are associated with the cost of equity (correlation analysis)16. 
RQ2: What changed in Angolan banks when the IFRS were adopted?  
The objective of RQ2 is to understand how the cost of equity was affected by the adoption of 
IFRS and how the variation in other variables may have influenced its impact. This question 
focuses on the years 2015 and 2016 and separates the data between banks, which adopted and did 
not adopt IFRS. It analyzes how the variables changed in that period, in order to find differences 
and similarities between them. 
                                                          
16 Data was prepared and analyzed in an excel file, which is also a contribution of this research, seen as aggregate 
information of the Angolan banking sector is scarce. It can be used for researchers in the future. 
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RQ3: How do the country and company-specific variables impact the cost of equity of Angolan 
banks?  
The third RQ aims to understand the relation between the mandatory adoption of IFRS and the 
cost of equity. Based on prior research (Li 2010, Castillo, Menéndez and Orgaz 2014), we ran an 
OLS regression, in SPSS. The dependent variable is the cost of equity and the independent 
variables are the adoption of IFRS (yes/no) and the other variables that are also expected to 
influence this cost, as detailed below. The regression model is as follows: 
 𝑟𝑒 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 +  𝛽2𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑃𝑆 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑎𝑥
+ 𝛽8𝐵𝑖𝑔𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑟 + 𝛽9𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝛽10𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 + 𝛽11𝐶𝐸𝑂 + 𝛽12𝐶𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽13𝐺𝐷𝑃




Where re is the cost of equity. The company-specific variables are: IFRS, a binary variable 
equal to one for the banks which adopted IFRS; Assets, logarithm of total assets; Counters, number 
of bank counters; Leverage, debt to equity ratio; ROA, return on assets; DPS, dividend per share; 
Tax, effective tax rate; BigFour, a binary variable equal to one if the bank is audited by a Big Four 
firm; Opinion, a binary variable equal to one if the auditor’s report is qualified; Admin, percentage 
of shares owned by managers; CEO, a binary variable equal to one if the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) owns shares; Con, the ownership concentration. The country-specific variables are: GDP, 
the Angolan Gross Domestic Product; Inf, the inflation rate in Angola; Interest, the risk-free interest 
rates in Angola; Corruption, the index of corruption in Angola. ɛ is the random error. 
Details on the variables are presented in Appendix 1, namely their proxies, the expected sign 
of the coefficient, formula and source from the literature review. As the cost of equity is a 
continuous variable, regressions with categorical or count variables were automatically excluded 
and the multiple linear regression was chosen (OLS), as it is an effective method to implement, 
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analyze and interpret17. This Work Project also adds to the literature by including as variables the 
dividends, effective tax rate, independence of administrators and CEOs, and risk-free interest rates, 
which as far as we know, have not been considered before.  
Sample Description 
There are currently 30 banking institutions authorized to operate in Angola18, 13 of which 
adopted IFRS in 2016 and 17 which did not (Banco Nacional de Angola 2018). As information on 
these banks is scarce in databases, all data was hand collected from the individual annual reports 
of each bank, available at the banks’ websites. The research covers a period of five years, from 
2012 to 2016. The latter is the most recent year with available financial reporting data and for 
periods before 2012 only ten banks had their financial statements available. This range provides a 
four-year span before the mandatory adoption of IFRS and the first year of adoption of those 
standards. However, some banks were not included in the sample according to the following 
criteria. One bank (EcoBank) was excluded because, although authorized to operate in Angola, it 
had not yet started operations in 2016. Of the 29 banks currently operating in Angola, 11 banks do 
not have their financial statements available online, for the whole or part of the selected period. 
Moreover, two state-owned banks (Banco de Desenvolvimento de Angola and Banco de Comércio 
e Indústria) were removed, as they behaved differently from the other banks and were outliers19. 
Therefore, the final sample of this paper narrowed to 16 banks, 11 of which adopted IFRS. 
Appendix D shows the composition of the initial and final samples, which include 30 and 16 banks, 
respectively. 
                                                          
17 Its limitations are: it oversimplifies the relationship between two variables (in most situations variables do not behave 
linearly); results may be dubious when the sample does not have a normal distribution (that is solved for large samples); 
it is extremely sensitive to outliers (which has been partly solved by the removal of two banks with clear outlier results). 
18 Of which three are state-owned and 27 are private banks. 




A preliminary descriptive statistical analysis of the independent variables, both univariate and 
bivariate analysis (correlation), offers a brief overview of the characterization of Angolan banks. 
The banks’ size, leverage, profitability, dividends, effective tax rate, enforcement quality and 
corporate governance practices are set as independent variables for the banks’ risk and specific 
characteristics and the macroeconomic variables are set to account for the country’s features.  
Regarding size, Angolan banks in the sample are highly concentrated. In 2016, the assets of 
the five largest banks represented around 78% of the total assets of the sample and eight banks had 
assets above 300 million Kwanzas. The average assets in the sample have been increasingly 
growing from 2012-2016, growing 20.9% in 201620. The number of counters, another indicator of 
bank size, are also very concentrated and have been steadily growing throughout the same period.  
The leverage, measured by the debt to equity ratio, is exceptionally high in Angolan banks, 
meaning banks fund their activities mainly through debt. However, this ratio consistently decreased 
from 2014 to 2016, reflecting a change in the capital structure of the Angolan banks towards more 
equity-oriented funding. The sample average was 9.61 in 2014 and 8.28 in 2016.  
Profitability of Angolan banks, inferred from the ROA, is exceptionally volatile and disperse. 
In 2016, the most profitable bank was Banco VTB África, S.A., with a return of 18.89%, and the 
least efficient was Banco Angolano de Negócios e Comércio S.A., with a return of -2.23%, the only 
bank with negative returns. 
The dividends per share announced by the banks are a measure of shareholders’ expectations 
on their future earnings and have increased in value. In 2016, half of the banks in the sample 
announced they would pay dividends the following year and all of them were reporting under IFRS. 
                                                          
20 The sample shows values similar to those of KPMG’s “Analysis of the Angolan Banking Sector”, suggesting the 
sample in this paper is a good approximation to the whole sector. 
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The Effective tax rate was included to account for the fiscal effect, as the cost of equity is 
measured after tax21. The average effective tax rate of Angolan banks in the sample in 2015 and 
2016 was 14% and 4%, respectively. It is lower than the nominal corporate income tax rate set in 
the Industrial Tax Code, that was 30% in both periods (Osório and Cruz 2016). 
The binary variable BigFour was inserted as a proxy for external control and enforcement 
quality. By registering which banks were audited by one of the Big Four firms22, the reliability and 
quality of information reported were controlled. Most firms that aim to comply with government 
regulation, hire the services of one of the Big Four firms, for their expertise in the field of IFRS. 
In 2016, 12 of the 16 Angolan banks in the sample were audited by one of the Big Four firms, 
which remained relatively constant from 2012 to 2016. In 2016, five banks received a qualified 
audit report, accounted for in the variable Opinion, and only one originated from a Big Four firm. 
The shareholder structure influences corporate governance practices. Therefore, three 
variables regarding the independence of management and ownership concentration were added to 
the model. Only one bank in the sample is state-owned, Banco de Poupança e Crédito23. The CEO 
variable examines whether the CEO is also a shareholder, the Administrators variable what 
percentage of shares is owned by administrators and the Concentration variable how concentrated 
the shareholder structure is. Good corporate governance guidelines require managers’ 
independence of the shareholders, to avoid agency problems. On average, in the sample, around 
20% of each bank is owned by administrators, 11 of them have at least one administrator who owns 
shares and three of them have a CEO who also is a shareholder. Regarding concentration, large 
                                                          
21 In 2014, Angola’s Law No. 19/14 was endorsed, reviewing the Corporate Income Tax Code (Código do Imposto 
Industrial) and is in force since 2015. The revised tax code extended the income tax basis and decreased the tax rate 
from 35% to 30%. However, financial intermediation and insurance services were exempt (EY 2014). 
22 The commonly called Big Four firms is a reference to the four largest professional services firms in the world, which 
also provide audit and accounting services. They are KPMG, Deloitte, PWC and EY. 
23 Caixa Geral Angola S.A. is considered a private bank for this study, even though it is 51 percent owned by Grupo 
Caixa Geral, a Portuguese state-owned group. 
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shareholders may have a higher interest in the long-term growth and are more able to control 
management, but they can also take advantage of their position for their own benefit at the expense 
of smaller shareholders (Wilson and Schleifer 2013). In the sample, the concentration of 
shareholders is highly correlated with the lack of independence, meaning that Angolan banks that 
have less independence of management also face a higher ownership concentration.  
Regarding the country-specific variables, the risk-free rates in Angola are an indicator of the 
country’s risk. They gradually declined until 2014, when the oil crisis hit the country, and they 
increased significantly, from nine to 16 percent in two years. The market risk premium, a 
compensation to investors for the added risk of the market, is influenced by factors such as the 
economic situation of the country or its level of corruption. Angola’s GDP suffered a sharp decline, 
after reaching its highest value ever recorded, due to the drop of oil prices in 201424. The inflation 
rate is also a concern, having grown in 2015 and 2016, reaching 34.74% in the latter year (The 
World Bank 2018). Regarding corruption, the country is also in a worse position, declining from 
an already a low score of 22, in 2012, to 18 in 201625, in the corruption perception index. 
6. Results  
Evolution of the cost of equity (RQ1) 
Due to the country’s economic and political risk, both the risk-free and market risk premium 
rates were exceedingly high. This resulted in the cost of equity of Angolan banks also being 
superior in value, in the years 2012-2016. It increased from 66% to 75%, from 2012 to 2015, and 
decreased to 70%, in 2016, the year of IFRS adoption. Its evolution is demonstrated in Chart I and 
Appendix E. 
                                                          
24 Angola’s GDP peaked in 2014, reaching 126.78 billion USD and declined to 95.34 billion USD in 2016. 
25 In a scale from 0 to 100, in which 0 is highly corrupt and 100 is very clean (Transparency International 2018). 
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Chart I – Evolution of the cost of equity in Angolan banks 
However, this alone is not sufficient to 
determine a causality relationship. The 
research proceeds with the analysis of 
factors that might have influenced the cost 
of equity. It has stronger correlations with 
the (i) ROA (p=0.64); (ii) ownership 
concentration (p=0.53); (iii) size variables: 
number of counters (p=-0.37) and assets 
(p=-0.34). The table of correlations is shown in Appendix F. 
Although it is positively correlated with the cost of equity, the ROA decreased until 2014 and 
increased afterward, on average. The average net income steadily grew throughout the years 2012-
2016, with a more acute growth in the last year. As the banks’ investments increased their 
profitability, the investors’ required return decreased. The ownership concentration remained 
relatively constant throughout 2012-2016 but followed fairly the same pattern as the cost of equity. 
As minority shareholders lose power (higher concentration) it is natural that they require a higher 
return on their investment, considering the added risk. The Angolan banks’ size, proxied by the log 
of assets and number of counters, constantly increased from 2012 to 2016 (it grew significantly 
more in the latter) and both are negatively correlated with the cost of equity. As growth in size 
often signals a good financial condition, the larger increase in the number of counters and assets 
coheres with the decline of the cost of equity, in 2016.  
Despite the low correlation between the cost of equity and the macroeconomic variables, these 
are still relevant. The high level of the cost of equity in Angolan banks can be attributed to the 



















 Cost of Equity Average
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The GDP grew strongly until 2014 (when the economic downfall began) and started declining 
rapidly, while the opposite happened to the inflation and risk-free rates. It would be expected that 
a worsening economic situation would increase the cost of equity. However, that is not observed 
in this study. It may be that other industries of the economy were more affected than the banking 
sector, or that the effects will only be seen in the long run. 
A closer look into 2016, the first period of mandatory adoption of IFRS for Angolan banks, is 
given in the following sub-section, in order to understand the main differences between those banks 
that did and did not adopt IFRS and how its effect may have been influenced by the company-
specific variables. 
Differences between banks that adopted IFRS and non-IFRS adopters (RQ2) 
In 2016, in this paper’s sample, 11 banks adopted IFRS and five did not, with no early 
voluntary adoption reported. Differences were observed between these two groups of banks in 
respect to the cost of equity, dividends per share, enforcement quality variables and corporate 
governance practices, as shown in Table I. Cross-variable tables are presented in Appendix G. 
Table I. Characteristics of the Angolan banks: IFRS-adopters versus non-IFRS adopters 
 Adopted IFRS Did not Adopt IFRS 
 Average 2015 2016 2015 2016 
Cost of Equity                 0.73                  0.77                          0.79                          0.55  
Assets                 8.42                  8.50                          7.91                          7.97  
Counters               99.36              101.36                        97.40                      106.00  
Leverage                 9.50                  8.43                          7.75                          8.00  
ROA                 0.09                  0.10                          0.11                          0.09  
DPS                 1.85                  2.77                          0.01                             -    
Tax                 0.14                  0.07                          0.18                          0.01  
BigFour                 0.91                  0.82                          0.60                          0.60  
Opinion                     -                    0.09                          0.80                          0.80  
Administrators                 0.23                  0.20                          0.20                          0.23  
CEO                 0.27                  0.27                             -                               -    
Concentration                 0.27                  0.26                          0.05                          0.05  
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The banks that adopted the IFRS had, on average, a lower cost of equity than non-adopters, in 
the pre-adoption period. However, after the adoption, the average cost of equity increased in the 
banks that adopted IFRS26 and decreased in the ones which did not. This result is contrary to what 
was expected and is even more accentuated considering that banks reporting under IFRS should 
have lower costs of equity than if they were reporting under CONTIF (accounting wise)27. This is 
most likely a result of the method used to calculate the cost of equity. In banks which adopted 
IFRS, the net income increased and at a higher rate than the equity. Therefore, in banks that adopted 
IFRS, the cost of equity increases because shareholders require a higher return rate, even though 
the banks increased their net incomes. Previous literature explains that in developing countries, 
among other challenges such as the lack of expertise in the field of international standards and 
enforcement mechanisms, increased costs with the adoption may interfere with the purposed effects 
of adopting IFRS. 
Dividends per share in banks that adopted IFRS amounted to 2.77 thousand Kwanzas on 
average, whereas the non-IFRS adopters did not pay any dividends. As the payout ratio was kept 
relatively constant in every bank and the net income increased in 2016, so did the dividends.  
Regarding the enforcement quality, banks which adopted the IFRS presented higher efforts 
than non-IFRS adopters, as a larger portion of them hired services from reliable international 
auditors and had a significantly lower percentage of qualified reports. However, it is also shown 
that, even though outperforming in this category, the banks that adopted IFRS worsened their 
reporting quality in 2016, presenting a higher level of qualified reports. This may be an indicator 
that, even though the standards were applied, they may not have been done so appropriately.  
                                                          
26 On eight of the eleven banks which adopted IFRS, their cost of equity increased, in 2016. 
27 If there were no adjustments when reporting in IFRS, banks which adopted the standards would have an even higher 
cost of equity. 
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In regards to the CEO variable, agency problems may appear only in banks which adopted 
IFRS, as the CEOs are not shareholders in the banks that did not adopt IFRS. Moreover, ownership 
of the banks is much more concentrated in banks that adopted IFRS. Again, this adds to the 
evidence that in the banks that adopted IFRS, the lack of independence of CEOs, the higher 
concentration and the increased number of qualified reports, may have interfered with the expected 
reduction of cost of equity related with the IFRS adoption. 
Factors that impact the cost of equity of Angolan banks (RQ3) 
An OLS regression, including all the variables previously considered important in explaining 
the cost of equity, the company-specific variables (IFRS, firm size, leverage, ROA, DPS, effective 
tax rate, enforcement quality and corporate governance practices) and country-specific variables 
(GDP, inflation rate, risk free interest rate and level of corruption)28, was run and the results are 
presented in Appendix H. However, to ensure that only the variables that maximize the relevance 
of the model were included, we applied the Backwards29 method, which did not include the 
country-specific variables. Table II and 
Appendix I show the results of this regression. 
The F-test, which tests whether the regression 
used fits the data, considers this model 
significant and the Adjusted coefficient of 
determination (R2), which determines what 
percentage of the dependent variable variance is 
explained by the model, amounts to 68.9%. 
                                                          
28 For a significance level of five percent, variables should have a p-value lower than 0.05 to be considered relevant. 
29 The Backwards method, a tool offered by SPSS, consists on removing variables until the model with the best fit is 
found. 





t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error 
 (Constant) -2.670 .768 -3.476 .001 
Assets -.288 .095 -3.033 .003 
Counters -.002 .001 -3.655 .000 
Leverage .020 .007 2.741 .008 
ROA .070 .008 8.744 .000 
BigFour .078 .075 1.043 .300 
Opinion .321 .086 3.739 .000 
Administrators -.002 .001 -1.205 .232 
CEO .111 .079 1.394 .168 
Concentration .012 .002 5.537 .000 
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This model shows the highest adjusted R squared and lowest standard error possible. Of the 
nine variables inserted in the updated model the statistically significant variables (p-value < 0.05) 
are company characteristic variables, namely banks’ size (Log of Assets (p=0.003), Number of 
counters (p=0.000)), leverage (Debt to equity ratio (p=0.008)), profitability (ROA (p=0.000)), 
auditors’ opinion (p=0.000) and ownership concentration (p=0.000).  
With everything else constant, when the log of assets (β=-0.288) or number of counters (β=-
0.002) increase one unit, the cost of equity is expected to decrease by 28.8% or 0.2%, respectively. 
Regarding leverage, when the debt to equity ratio (β=0.02) increases one unit, the cost of equity is 
expected to increase 2%. These results are in line with the literature. Researchers predict that 
investors of larger and less leveraged firms require lower returns. As they perceive them to be more 
established and have a lower risk of default, the cost of equity decreases (Li 2010, Patro 2014). 
Regarding profitability, with everything else constant, when the ROA (β=0.07) increases one 
unit, the cost of equity is expected to increase 7%. Previous research found opposite results, as a 
higher ROA signals investors a superior profitability and as a result, market shares increase and 
the cost of equity decreases (Castillo, Menéndez and Orgaz 2014). However, in this paper, book 
values were used and, when the net income increases the cost of equity also increases, because 
equity increases at a lower rate than the income.  
Regarding the enforcement quality, with everything else constant, when the Opinion 
(β=0.321) of the audit report is qualified, the cost of equity is expected to increase 32.1%. To the 
best of our knowledge, this variable was never considered in previous research on this topic. 
However, the results verify the hypothesis that banks with qualified audit reports, have lower 
enforcement and reporting quality and therefore have a higher cost of equity. 
In terms of corporate governance practices, with everything else constant, when the ownership 
concentration (β=0.012) – the median value of the three shareholders with the highest number of 
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shares – increases one unit, the cost of equity is expected to increase 1.2%. As predicted, banks 
with lower ownership concentration have more financial reporting incentives and higher 
enforcement mechanisms, reducing its cost of equity (Lee, Walker and Christensen 2008).  
6. Conclusion  
The purpose of this Work Project was to understand the impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS 
on the cost of equity, in Angolan banks. The literature suggests IFRS bring more transparency, 
reliability and quality to financial reporting practices, but there is still much controversy regarding 
its real impact on the cost of equity. Even more in African developing countries, in which research 
on the area is scarce. This research contributes to the literature by adding empirical evidence of the 
impact of adopting IFRS in the cost of equity, in Angolan banks, and evidence of other country 
and company-specific variables that influenced the cost of equity. 
The cost of equity in Angolan banks is exceedingly high. It continuously increased from 2012 
to 2015, until it decreased in 2016, the year of IFRS adoption. A closer insight at the adoption 
period determined that, unexpectedly, banks that adopted IFRS increased their cost of equity. 
Previous literature explains that certain challenges, such as the lack of expertise in the field of 
international standards and enforcement mechanisms, may interfere with the purposed effects of 
adopting IFRS in developing countries. The results show that banks that adopted IFRS had a 
significant increase in qualified reports by their auditors, suggesting they were not properly applied.  
The results of the OLS regression show that the adoption of IFRS does not explain significantly 
the cost of equity in Angolan banks, at least in the short term. Other factors such as dividends, 
effective tax rate, auditor, managers’ independence and the macroeconomic variables are also not 
relevant. Nonetheless, the company-specific variables banks’ size, leverage, ROA, auditors’ 
opinion and ownership concentration are significant in explaining the cost of equity of Angolan 
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banks. Furthermore, the cost of equity decreases when the banks’ size increases and when the 
leverage ratio, ROA, qualified opinion and ownership concentration of banks decrease. These 
results, with the exception of ROA, are in line with the literature on the topic.  
This paper is subject to some limitations and its results depend on the methodology chosen. 
The rPEG model could not be used in the calculation of the cost of equity, due to the absence of 
analysts’ estimation of future earnings, making it difficult to measure the cost of equity. An 
adjusted Dividend Growth model was used, substituting dividends by earnings and market values 
by book values. Additionally, the paper only considers the first year of IFRS adoption and does not 
capture the long-term effects on the cost of equity. Furthermore, the number of observations of 
banks that adopted IFRS was limited to one year, much smaller than the ones that did not adopt. 
At last, for banks that adopted IFRS and presented their 2015 and 2016 financial statements 
according to IFRS, it presents some accounting differences compared to CONTIF. In 2015, the 
data reported under both accounting standards shows banks that reported in IFRS had a lower cost 
of equity than when using CONTIF.  
For future research, it could prove fruitful to do a similar research a few years after the 
adoption. With more observations of banks that adopted IFRS and more time to properly enforce 
them, the impact of these standards should be more noticeable. Moreover, the macroeconomic 
environment is paramount in explaining the exceedingly high cost of equity and its evolution. 
Finding different, more relevant proxies to explain it could yield interesting results. At last, if 
predictions on future earnings and the beta of each bank were calculated, this could allow a more 
accurate method to measure the cost of equity using the rPEG or CAPM. 
The main barrier to Angola’s economic progress is the absence of an attractive business 
environment. Though this country is making noticeable improvements, by adopting IFRS and 
planning to open the stock market, Angola should make larger efforts to have a workforce with 
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more expertise in all levels of business and avoid corruption. If the government is able to increase 
transparency, quality and relevance of information reported, it will enhance the confidence in the 
markets and decrease the cost of equity, helping the economy to develop.   
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Appendices required for the comprehension of the paper 
Appendix 1 – Variables in the regression model 
 
Source: Banks’ Annual Reports and World Bank database. 
Variable Accounting for Expected 
sign of the 
coefficient 
Formula Literature Review 
IFRS Adoption of IFRS - Dummy variable: equal to 1 if 
adopted the IFRS and 0 otherwise. 
(Li 2010, Castillo, 
Menéndez and Orgaz 
2014, Lee, Walker 
and Christensen 
2008) 
DPS Expected payout to 
shareholders 
- Total dividends 
Ordinary shares –  Own shares
 
a) 
Assets Bank size - Log of total assets (Li 2010, Patro 2014, 
Castillo, Menéndez 
and Orgaz 2014, 
Ames 2013) 
Counters Bank size - Number of counters of each bank This research 
Leverage Level of indebtedness + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
(Lee, Walker and 
Christensen 2008, 
Ames 2013) 






and Orgaz 2014) 
Tax  Effective Tax rate – 
Fiscal effect 




Big Four Quality of standards’ 
enforcement efforts 
- Dummy variable: equal to 1 if 
audited by a Big Four firm and 0 
otherwise 
(Barth, Landsman 
and Lang 2006, Al-
Akra, Eddie and Ali 
2010) 
Opinion Quality of standards’ 
enforcement efforts 
+ Dummy variable: equal to 1 if the 










+ Dummy variable: equal to 1 if CEO 





+ Median value of the three 
shareholders with the highest 
number of shares 
(Lee, Walker and 
Christensen 2008) 
GDP Angola’s Gross 
Domestic Product  
- Total GDP at constant prices, 
directly retrieved from source. 
(Castillo, Menéndez 
and Orgaz 2014) 
Inflation Angola’s Inflation  + Directly retrieved from source. (Li 2010, Castillo, 
Menéndez and Orgaz 
2014) 
Interest Rates Country’s general 
level of risk 
+ Risk-free national rates, from bonds 
issued by the government 
a) 
Corruption Level of Corruption in 
Angola 
+ Corruption Index (Riahi and Khoufi 
2015, Houqe and 
Monem 2016) 
a) To the best of our knowledge, this variable was included only in this research. 
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Appendices not required for the comprehension of the paper30 
 





Where r = rate of return, cost of equity, EPS1 = expected earnings per share in 1 year, t = 1; EPS2 









Appendix B - Gordon’s Dividend Growth model formula 
 
 
In which V0 is the value of the company in moment 0; Div1 is the dividend expected to be paid in 
the following year, moment 1; RRE is the Required Return on Equity; and g is the expected growth 
rate of the dividends. In theory, the Required Return on Equity should be the same as the cost of 















                                                          

























































Shareholder's Equity according to CONTIF        463,891,666  
Impairment of loans to customers       (6,822,711) 
Application of the effective rate to the securities portfolio 140,621  
Application of the effective rate to the customer loan 
portfolio         (6,157,295) 
Application of the effective rate to the portfolio of customer 
deposits             (571,632) 
Application of effective tax rate to subordinated liabilities               (47,178) 
Annulment of assets not eligible for capitalization             (221,672) 
Reclassification of the social fund               (10,325) 
Deferred taxes arising from transition adjustments            3,626,184 
Total adjustments reported        (10,064,008) 
Equity in accordance with IAS/IFRS        453,827,658  
Total adjustments as a % of Equity in accordance with 
CONTIF -2.17% 
Net Income for the Year in accordance with CONTIF        119,775,858  
Impairment of loans to customers          (4,815,703) 
Adjustment resulting from the revaluation of OT's Indexed 
to USD               395,795  
Application of the effective rate to the securities portfolio               107,213  
Application of the effective rate to the customer loan 
portfolio          (1,927,543) 
Application of the effective rate to the portfolio of 
customer deposits             (181,141) 
Application of the effective rate to subordinated liabilities               (25,602) 
Annulment of assets not eligible for capitalization                  26,411  
Annulment of reserves of revaluation of tangible and 
intangible assets             (228,585) 
Deferred taxes arising from transition adjustments             1,533,684  
Total adjustments reported          (5,115,471) 
Net income for the year in accordance with IAS/IFRS        114,660,387  









































BANCO ANGOLANO DE INVESTIMENTOS, 
S.A. 
BAI Yes Yes  
BANCO YETU, S.A. YETU No No a) 
BANCO ANGOLANO DE NEGÓCIOS E 
COMÉRCIO, S.A. 
BANC No Yes  
BANCO BAI MICRO FINANÇAS, S.A.                       BMF No No a) 
BANCO BIC, S.A.  BIC Yes Yes  
BANCO CAIXA GERAL ANGOLA, S.A.            BCGA Yes Yes  
BANCO COMERCIAL ANGOLANO, S.A. BCA Yes Yes  
BANCO COMERCIAL DO HUAMBO, S.A. BCH No No a) 
BANCO DE COMÉRCIO E INDÚSTRIA, S.A. BCI No No b) 
BANCO DE DESENVOLVIMENTO DE 
ANGOLA, S.A. 
BDA No No b) 
BANCO DE FOMENTO ANGOLA, S.A. BFA Yes Yes  
BANCO DE INVESTIMENTO RURAL, S.A. BIR No No a) 
BANCO DE NEGÓCIOS INTERNACIONAL, 
S.A. 
BNI Yes Yes  
BANCO DE POUPANÇA E CRÉDITO, S.A. BPC No Yes  
BANCO ECONÓMICO, S.A.  BE Yes No a) 
BANCO KEVE, S.A.  KEVE No Yes  
BANCO KWANZA INVESTIMENTO, S.A.  BKI No Yes  
BANCO PRESTÍGIO, S.A. BPG No No a) 
BANCO MILLENNIUM ATLÂNTICO, S.A. BPA Yes Yes  
BANCO MAIS, S.A. BMAIS No No a) 
BANCO SOL, S.A. BSOL Yes Yes  
BANCO VALOR, S.A.  BVB No Yes  
BANCO VTB ÁFRICA, S.A. VTB Yes Yes  
ECOBANK DE ANGOLA, S.A. ECO No No c) 
FINIBANCO ANGOLA, S.A.  FNB Yes Yes  
STANDARD BANK DE ANGOLA, S.A.  SBA Yes Yes  
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK DE 
ANGOLA, S.A. 
SCBA Yes No a) 
BCS – BANCO DE CRÉDITO DO SUL, S.A. BCS No No a) 
BANCO POSTAL, S.A. BPT No No a) 
BANCO DA CHINA LIMITADA – SUCURSAL 
EM LUANDA 
BOCLB No No a) 
a) Financial information partially or fully unavailable; b) Outliers; c) No activity 
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Cost of Equity 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
 Average  0.66 0.64 0.65 0.75 0.70 
 Maximum  1.94 1.89 1.51 1.93 2.55 
 Minimum  0.30 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.17 
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0.08  
           
(0.20) 
             
0.08  
                
0.01  
             
0.02  
                        
(0.05) 
                         
0.02  
     
(0.77) 
                      
1.00    
Interest 
                              
0.05     0.77  
        
0.09  
                      
0.14  
                           
0.06  
   
(0.02) 
              
0.09  
           
(0.19) 
             
0.10  
                
0.01  
             
0.03  
                        
(0.06) 
                             
0.03  
     
(0.85) 
                      
0.99  
        
1.00   
Corruption  
                            
(0.08)  (0.19) 
       
(0.05) 
                    
(0.16) 
                         
(0.09) 
    
(0.12) 
             
(0.05) 
             
0.20  
           
(0.21) 
                
0.03  
           
(0.05) 
                          
0.06  
                           
(0.02) 
       
0.71  
                    
(0.26) 
      
(0.35) 





Appendix G – Cross Variable tables in 2016 
IFRS  








Increased 8 2 10 
Decreased  3 3 6 




IFRS  IFRS Non-IFRS 
Adopters 
 
Auditor Adopters Total 
Big Four 
Company 
56,25% 18,75% 75,0% 
Non-Big Four 12,5% 12,5% 25,0% 
Total 68,75% 31,25% 100,0% 
 
 
IFRS  IFRS Non-IFRS 
Adopters 
 
Independence Adopters Total 
CEO owns shares 18,75% 0,00% 18,75% 
CEO does not own 
shares  
50,00% 31,25% 81,25% 
Total 68,75% 31,25% 100,0% 
 
 
IFRS  IFRS Non-IFRS 
Adopters 
 
Costo of equity Adopters Total 
Increased 50,00% 12,50% 62,50% 
Decreased 18,75% 18,75% 37,50% 










Big Four  9 3 12 
Non-Big Four  2 2 5 









CEO owns shares 3 0 3 
CEO does not own 
shares  
8 5 13 
Total 11 5 16 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Non-IFRS Adopters
IFRS Adopters
Cost of equity in 2016
Increased Decreased




Big Four Non-Big Four
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Non-IFRS Adopters
IFRS Adopters
CEO independence in 2016











t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) -2.117 2.542  -.833 .408 
IFRS .051 .153 .040 .336 .738 
Assets -.336 .113 -.538 -2.989 .004 
Counters -.002 .001 -.504 -3.426 .001 
Leverage .017 .009 .178 1.948 .056 
ROA .069 .009 .724 7.866 .000 
DPS -.010 .012 -.079 -.854 .396 
Tax .001 .001 .057 .765 .447 
BigFour .099 .087 .106 1.134 .261 
Opinion .360 .093 .378 3.866 .000 
Administrators -.002 .001 -.103 -1.208 .231 
CEO .138 .088 .132 1.567 .122 
Concentration .013 .003 .509 4.933 .000 
GDP -.004 .011 -.116 -.333 .740 
Inflation .007 .029 .173 .251 .802 
Interest -.062 .153 -.351 -.403 .688 








Square F Sig. 
   Regression 11.244 16 .703 10.947 .000 
Residual 4.044 63 .064   









R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 












t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) -2.670 .768  -3.476 .001 
Assets -.288 .095 -.461 -3.033 .003 
Counters -.002 .001 -.493 -3.655 .000 
Leverage .020 .007 .213 2.741 .008 
ROA .070 .008 .735 8.744 .000 
BigFour .078 .075 .084 1.043 .300 
Opinion .321 .086 .336 3.739 .000 
Administrators -.002 .001 -.095 -1.205 .232 
CEO .111 .079 .106 1.394 .168 
Concentration .012 .002 .447 5.537 .000 















Square F Sig. 
   Regression 11.070 9 1.230 20.409 .000 
Residual 4.219 70 .060   
Total 15.288 79    
Model Summary 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
.851 .724 .689 .2455 
